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Abstract: The paper focuses on Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude. If presented there arguments 
(based on concepts of arche-fossil and ancestrality, contingency, factiality and unreason) are valid 
and refute the fundamental thesis of correlationism – impossibility to access the reality outside cor-
relation between thinking and being – then we should be able to exceed it form the scientiﬁ c ground 
it was formulated upon and to apply it to theory of culture. The paper considers that possibility and 
follows the consequences of such broadening. What is culture in speculative realism’s ontological 
paradigm? How to grasp cultural reality that is no longer a correlate of human subjectivity? Culture, 
its processes, objects, networks would not be human any more, ontologically. Rather, one might 
say, it emerged that culture is non-human. However, these questions and indications have now 
existed for long time in philosophy of culture, theory of culture, anthropology, cybernetics, media 
studies, ecology and many other disciplines. Issue that arises in regard of prior is the problem of 
theory of culture within speculative materialist perspective. If one acknowledges the arche-fossil 
argument, one cannot continue to approach culture in structuralist or phenomenological current. 
Meillassoux claims that mathematical ideation describes the objective structure of reality as it is 
in-itself. If mathematisation is the condition for theory, how can we theorise culture? The aim of the 
paper is to problematise the concept of culture and theory of culture in perspective of Meillassoux’s 
speculation.
Keywords: Quentin Meillassoux, speculative materialism, arche-fossil, theory of culture, post-hu-
manism
Why should we care about reintroducing the 16th century distinction between the 
primary and the secondary qualities? If anything, this is far from being one of the prob-
lems that excite contemporary humanities the most. It resembles stiﬂ ing scholastic 
deliberations and it seemed like it is has been dealt with in the past and left behind. 
For Quentin Meillassoux, however, this is at the core of his speculative materialism’s 
project, for it imposes consequences on variety of diﬀ erent planes: epistemological 
truth, ontological grounding of knowledge, political refutation of dogmatism and re-
institution of rationality within discourse. Also, it has implications in how we think 
about culture – we shall follow this line later on.
So, now, almost ten years since the publication of After Finitude, it is well known 
among intellectuals and artists concerned by so called “continental philosophy” that 
Meillassoux tackles the foundations of the most of prominent 20th century philo-
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sophical theories and admittedly he does it in a brilliant way. For many decades we 
observe measurable and overwhelming progress of scientiﬁ c knowledge, with what 
philosophy has a diﬃ  cult relationship. Meillassoux summons up a few statements 
that can be found in school textbooks, like “the date of the origin of the universe 
(13.5 billion years ago); the date of the accretion of the earth (4.56 billion years ago); 
the date of origin of life on earth (3.5 billion years ago); the date of the origin of 
humankind (Homo habilis, 2 million years ago).”1 It seems that “empirical science 
is today capable of producing statements about events anterior to the advent of life 
as well as consciousness.”2 Modern philosophy, as Meillassoux points out, indebted 
and embedded in Immanuel Kant’s three famous Critiques, generally agrees that sci-
ence formulates facts about world, but nonetheless it always underlines the position 
from which these are produced. It was Edmund Husserl who, in the name of all heirs 
of Kant, explicitly expressed philosopher’s standpoint towards scientist’s one – the 
latter has a “natural attitude” towards the world, what means he does not recognise 
his perspective, from which he claims these truths.3 On the other hand, philosopher 
is someone, who brackets this naïve attitude and takes a step into critical or transcen-
dental attitude acknowledging the ﬁ nitude of thought. Therefore, “he will not contest 
the claim that it is in fact event Y that occurred, nor will he contest the dating of this 
event. No – he will simply add – perhaps only to himself, but add it he will – some-
thing like a simple codicil, always the same one, which he will discretely append to 
the end of the phrase: event Y occurred x number of years before the emergence of 
humans – for humans (or even, for the human scientist).”4 The moment he brackets 
scientiﬁ c statement with “for us, for humans, as far as it goes”, he undermines any 
possibility of knowledge about the world beyond human thought, because the object 
of scientist reference is only an object related to a subject that posits it. We cannot 
point to an object existing in-itself before existence of any thought. So, according to 
Meillassoux, asking straightforwardly a philosopher of Kantian provenience if the 
universe is 13.5 billion years old, he can give no convincing answer. Then, the trouble 
is what science talks about? Is it all just a play of reproducing metatheory of valid 
views?5 Step in what direction philosophy should take to give a meaningful response?
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant deﬁ ned the modern approach to rationality by 
solving (as Meillassoux names it in Potentiality and Virtuality) the “Hume’s problem” 
1 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, transl. R. Brassier, Con-
tinuum, London 2008, p. 9.
2 Ibidem.
3 E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – 
First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, transl. F. Kersten, Nijhoﬀ , Hague 1983, 
sec. 1, 2, 26.
4 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude…, op. cit., p. 13.
5 Ibidem, p. 17.
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that can be encapsulated as “the problem of the grounding of causal connection.”6 
According to David Hume, we cannot justify, why we expect the reality to obey a cer-
tain set of laws (i.e. physical or logical). Only reasonable explanation is to ascribe 
them to a subjective habit.7 Kant agrees with the Scot: time, space and causality are 
not properties of the exterior world, but habit is an insuﬃ  cient answer, too. To beco-
me accustomed to something, i.e. to certain way we experience, there has to be a form 
that organises every experience we have (that later might become a habit). World, as 
we know it, is constructed by the subject – time, space and categories ordering rea-
lity are not exactly experienced, but they make any experience possible. Due to our 
subjective structure we organise the chaotic data collected by our senses; these are 
transcendental conditions of experience, pure forms of sensibility and a priori catego-
ries. If our reason holds conditions for any possible experience and knowledge, it is 
impossible to have access to reality outside correlation between thinking and being.8 
We cannot reach the in-itself (noumena) with our thought, because in-itself would be 
indiﬀ erent to how we perceive it – we perceive always within our own transcendental 
conditions, so everything must be posited as for-us (fenomena).9
Meillassoux gave a name to this post-Kantian model, which breaks out from the 
dichotomy of realism–idealism and stands between both; name that (what Graham 
Harman in his monograph on Meillassoux admits) was “rapidly adopted” and has 
“made a permanent contribution to the philosophical lexicon”.10 “Correlationism is 
any current of thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the corre-
lation so deﬁ ned”.11 The problem that he faces is the question: how is it possible 
that science thinks facts that occurred before the world could be given for human 
thought? Meillassoux goes back to the “Hume’s problem” and comes up with an 
alternative proposition to Kant’s solution. Alain Badiou noticed in preface to After 
Finitude that Meillassoux’s approach is so stunning on the grounds that he “like Kant, 
(…) saves necessity, including logical necessity. But like Hume, he grants that there 
6 Q. Meillassoux, Potentiality and Virtuality, transl. R. Brassier, in: L. Bryant, N. Srnicek, G. Harman 
(eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, re.press, Melbourne 2011, 
p. 224–236.
7 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon, Oxford 1960. Argumentation against necessity 
of causality is set out in part III of ﬁ rst book.
8 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. P. Guyer, A.W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 1998, ch. The ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena, 
p. 358: “The Transcendental Analytic accordingly has this important result: That the understanding 
can never accomplish a priori anything more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience 
in general, and, since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, it can never 
overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are merely 
principles of the exposition of appearances (…)”.
9 Ibidem, p. 359–365.
10 G. Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 
2011, p. 7.
11 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude…, op. cit., p. 13.
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is no acceptable ground for the necessity of the laws of nature”.12 If Meillassoux’s 
argumentation is valid and refutes the fundamental thesis of correlationism (that we 
cannot think the thing in-itself), then we should be able to extend the key concepts of 
ancestrality and arche-fossil, which provide for him the basis of such refutation, from 
the scientiﬁ c ground it was formulated upon (or from the being that emerged before 
any thought) and to apply into the cultural (beings that are present). What interests 
me, are the consequences of such broadening – does it shift the discipline and object 
of the theory of culture?
Meillassoux does not introduce us to concepts like arche-fossil, ancestrality, cor-
realtionism or speculative materialism until he begins with restoring the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities (that can be found already in Rene De-
scartes, though they appear explicitly in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding). The latter relates to aﬀ ective and sensual properties existing only 
in relation between being and thought. Therefore, they are for-us. Primary quali-
ties are properties of being in-itself – they do not depend on human perception. It 
is fundamental for Meillassoux, because to assume this distinction is to accept the 
possibility of having knowledge of things in-themselves. For Meillassoux, as it was 
for Descartes, knowledge is guaranteed due to primary qualities’ capacity of being 
mathematisable, the power13 science is able to exercise. In recalling such an idea of 
qualities, Meillassoux stands against correlationsm. Correlationism by maintaining 
that it is impossible to think of something that is not related to thought collapses 
the distinction between two types of properties. We cannot distinguish properties of 
correlation between the world and me from properties indiﬀ erent to my perception 
of the thing. I cannot get outside my own thought, thus I cannot compare and decide 
which qualities are primary or secondary – eventually I lose the basis for objective 
knowledge. Every attempt to represent in-itself instantly converts into for-me,14 every 
primary quality turns out to be secondary.15 Thus, “contemporary philosophers have 
lost the great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers.”16 To think the 
great outdoors is to reach the absolute – ontological grounding for thought that is in-
diﬀ erent to human situated thinking. Meillassoux must have asked himself, who was 
the last philosopher that attempted to think the absolute and had not done it within 
correlationism (like Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who absolutised the correla-
tion). He found this approach in Meditations on First Philosophy and to follow De-
scartes’ path he was forced to take up the distinction of properties. Restoring primary 
qualities Meillassoux opens a line for thinking something that is not in a necessary 
12 A. Badiou, Preface to Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude…, op. cit., p. vii.
13 We follow Spinoza’s notion of powers, i.e. the capacity for being aﬀ ected and to aﬀ ect other beings.
14 I. Kant, op. cit., p. 361.
15 D. Hume, op. cit., p. 226–231.
16 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude…, op. cit., p. 7.
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relation to thought.17 Nothing is necessarily correlated with thought. Thought is only 
correlated to itself.
It is important to acknowledge the validity of Kant’s refutation of realist absolute 
equated with a necessary object. Meillassoux makes his way towards speculative 
absolute within correlationism’s territory, but in the end decodes it with the disco-
very of absolute contingency. In order to distinct itself from idealism, which makes 
hypostasis of the correlation and falls back into metaphysics, correlationism must 
claim that correlation is contingent. This means it is possible that it ceases to exist; 
a human subject can die. But to think death of the subject, one must have a concept 
of non-correlational reality, “the great outside.” Even if correlationist says, “I do not 
know what is after death, it is unknowable, whether we die or not”, his standpoint still 
assumes that this claim comes from a contingent subject. If not, he inevitably reverts 
to idealism. But, and that is Meillassoux’s core argument, if he aﬃ  rms this absolute 
contingency, it is impossible to maintain at correlationism position and it converts 
into speculative position.
For Meillassoux correlationism led to a big loss, because philosophers have cut 
oﬀ  their capacity to think, what actually science does. That is why he brings forth the 
argument of the ancestriality. The key problem is: what is it scientists speak about, 
when they discuss age of universe or date of origin of life? How can we grasp the 
meaning of something that is anterior to every form of human relation to the world? 
(Human-world relation is just one among other entities). It is a transcendental prob-
lem, for which Meillassoux will try to give a non-transcendental answer. Obviously, 
Kant could not raise such an issue, since science contemporary to him did not have 
means to describe, what was before human existence – due to its apparatus at the time 
it could explore only actual world. It seems quite clear, why Kant understood scien-
tiﬁ c facts as necessarily related to thought. However, it is a problem for philosophers 
to stand on such a position in the wake of measurement of “an isotope whose rate of 
radioactive decay we know, or the luminous emission of a star that informs us as to 
the date of its formation”.18
Structurally, Meillassoux’s argument is very similar to Kant’s. Just as the author of 
Critique of Pure Reason, he recognises that science articulates certain kind of state-
ments (synthetic a priori for Kant, ancestral for Meillassoux) and notices these
statements work somehow in society. In order to understand, how they work and 
why are they valuable for society, we need to assure them with meaning. However, 
foregoing philosophy, in likes of correlationism or idealism, cannot provide these 
statements with literal meaning, which would not reduce them to a language game. It 
does not mean that on ground of Kant’s (or other correlationist’s) theory every stat-
ement is arbitral and empty of any meaning, but that they only describe how human 
17 However, something that Meillassoux had not accentuated, absolute must be in a contingent relation 
to thought. To think absolute, we have to have the power of thinking and the power of thinking 
absolute, but it does not imply that absolute exists merely as an object of thought.
18 Ibidem, p. 10.
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thinking works, not what and how works in the world-beyond-human. Here again 
is the reason to undertake the “Hume’s problem” ontologically and draw back to 
Descartes and try to think an absolute. How is it possible that science can articulate 
statements about reality radically non-human? Because it thinks the absolute.
Ancestrality relates to “any reality anterior to the emergence of the human spe-
cies.”19 Arche-fossils are materials indicating the existence of an ancestral reality, 
which existed before any sensible cognition and life. They cannot be expressed in 
secondary qualities, but can be described by primary. Meillassoux claims that an-
cestriality and arche-fossils cannot be interpreted adequately from a correlationist 
position, because the latter has to ﬂ atten the distinction between them and blurs the 
diﬀ erence. That is why ancestral statements are motives for abolishing post-Kantian 
philosophy. Correlationist will always hold that they give themselves as ancestral to 
us.20 In consequence this leads us to a point, where we cannot think of real time and 
real change, because we cannot think of emergence of intuition and givinness at all 
– everything had to become at once. We can think ancestral statements as true only 
within a sort of realism or materialism – that is when we guarantee that there is being, 
to which statements refer. The problem of ancestriality and arche-fossils is an onto-
logical problem, not empirical. It does not matter, if scientists got the numbers correct 
or not. It is all about the powers to conduct such a gesture of measuring the age of 
events in the world before human presence. Any being that indicates the existence 
of world that is not given can be an arche-fossil. In other words, every being, which 
reveals the absolute that is not a correlate of thought, is an arche-fossil. Science tells 
us that we are surrounded by mind-independent processes all the time.21 Ancestriality 
shows the capacity of science to grasp the absolute through mathematical method. 
This concept of ancestriality leads Meillassoux, in a detailed and profound argumen-
tation in third chapter of After Finitude, to the notion of the absolute that grounds 
knowledge. This absolute is the necessity of contingency. Since there cannot be (fol-
lowing Kant’s refutation of metaphysics) a necessary entity and correlationism is 
driven to admit that the radical outdoors, the positive principle of unreason comes 
up to establish the new absolute – everything must be, for no reason, contingent and 
only contingency is necessary. Otherwise, we ﬁ nd ourselves back within metaphys-
ics founded on the principle of suﬃ  cient reason. Meillassoux strongly insists “that 
the facticity of everything cannot be thought as a fact”22 and adds little later on: “the 
principle of factiality can be stated as follows: only facticity is not factual – viz., only 
the contingency of what is, is not itself contingent. But it is important to bear in mind 
the following: the principle of factiality does not claim that contingency is necessary; 
its precise claim is that contingency alone is necessary – and only this prevents it 
19 Ibidem.
20 I. Kant, op. cit., p. 362–363, paragraph beginning with: “The division of objects into (…)”.
21 It is not that science only tells us that fact before emergence of life is uncorraleted, but we are per-
petually among independent processes.
22 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude…, op. cit., p. 79.
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from being meta-physical.”23 Now, the aim for speculative philosophy is to seek and 
recognize the conditions of factiality, which should not be confused with conditions 
of the possibility related to critical or transcendental correlationism.
Drawing a lesson from Descartes, we may pose a question: how can and do we 
think absolute? Descartes has shown that primary qualities are measurable objec-
tively, i.e. independent of what we feel, sense or think. And this objectivity can be 
achieved by means of mathematics. Meillassoux gave an explanation of his project 
that synthesises traditions of realism and Kantism: “I don’t want to demonstrate that 
there is a necessary relation between mathematics and reality. My problem is a prob-
lem of possibility. In After Finitude, the problem that I encounter is that of explaining 
the possibility of science, physics, being able to describe a world without humans.”24 
So, it is not a naïve belief overlooking representation or mediation – mathematics 
are represented for us, granted – the quest is to reach through representation some-
thing beyond representation. Primary properties are mathematisable and do not need 
an observer for them to work. Events that occurred millions of years ago consist-
ed of primary qualities that sedimented in matter and today are recovered through 
arche-fossils – source of knowledge of what had happened. Yet, problematic series 
of questions, which already have been raised in a talk published in “Collapse” issue 
after the famous conference at Goldsmith’s University in 2007 by Ray Brassier,25 
seem to haunt After Finitude. They can be merged into this: is mathematics a single 
way to think the absolute? If so, it leaves us with very little to be sure about the world. 
But also, the issue is, how do we understand mathematics and primary properties? If 
it is a static explanation, where properties are length, depth and width, then certainly 
we should abandon speculative materialism’s ship, look for another captain and sail 
in direction that promises new lands. Opposite explanation, possible and desirable, 
would consider primary properties in more Spinozean/Deleuzean spirit, as an inﬁ nite 
set of powers that a body can exercise, depending on environment it founds itself in. 
Mathematics able to undertake movement, time, diﬀ erential calculus, intensities, etc.
Approaching the second part of this paper, two crucial consequences of specula-
tive materialism must be noticed. Firstly, the argument of ancestrality invokes dia-
chronicity that detaches humanity form the past. It establishes a form of pure past that 
23 Ibidem, p. 80.
24 R. Mackay (ed.), Collapse III, Urbanomic, Falmouth 2007, p. 328–329.
25 Ibidem, p. 331. Ray Brassier: “Okay. It’s a question of scientiﬁ city here: whether mathematical 
formalisation or mathematical science can and should be the privileged paradigm of scientiﬁ city. 
Because there’s another issue here, which is that lots of what we know about the world before and 
after humans is not mathematical knowledge. Lots of biology and geology is not mathematically 
formalised. And yet surely we want to say that we know that dinosaurs existed, and that we know quite 
a lot about the morphology of brontosauruses. I mean, I know the question of dating is crucial here, 
but it’s not just that we know that the accretion of the earth happened 4.5 billion years ago because 
we have a mathematical way of determining the date, but that we know much more. We know about 
the processes involved, which are geological, physical, chemical processes, just as we know an 
incredible amount about the pre-human world, about pre-human ﬂ ora and fauna.”
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is the source of meaning and creates a radical crack between people and that, from 
which they emerged. Also, it might suggest unraveling of thinking from its corporeal 
situation or composition within which society is produced. Thinking, then, has a pow-
er to reach there, where rest of the body cannot. Yet, it is body that thinks and also it 
is the situated knowledge that is the case – not situatedness of whole bodies. Body 
is ﬁ nite, body that thinks has ﬁ nite powers, but absolute knowledge is inﬁ nite. This 
refers to conceptual thinking and it seems that for Meillassoux pictorial (or any other 
kind of) thinking26 stays on the level of correlation and secondary qualities. Second-
ly, Meillassoux, by introducing a divide between primary and secondary qualities, 
reintroduces a line in the human through which what is non-human, coming from 
radical exterior, ﬂ ows within our thought. Whatever we do or think immediately rests 
in, on one hand, what we construct (secondary qualities), but on the other – stretches 
beyond our construction (primary qualities). Hence, is our thought ours anymore? 
Everything, including human life, gets caught in this double-folding.
Rather, than delivering a full and exhaustive summary and/or critique of After Fin-
itude – what would be probably needless and too extensive for this article – we aimed 
to indicate some threads and the overall air of the book, to show those of trajectories 
of Meillassoux’s thought that can inﬂ uence our concept of culture. If we aﬃ  rm this 
speculative approach, how do we take on culture? How to grasp cultural reality that is 
no longer a correlate of human subjectivity (in a transcendental and necessary way)? 
If After Finitude does not provide us with a new method of analysing culture or soci-
ety, maybe it contributes to and allies with existing ones? Ancestral argument shows 
that culture, its processes, objects, networks, ontologically would not be strictly hu-
man anymore, in the sense that human subject does not construct the reality merely 
by means of its own categories. Rather, one might say, from Meillassoux’s stand-
point, culture is non-human, because culture, as every being, although produced by 
bodies deﬁ ned as humans, is an arche-fossil, indicating reality outside our thought. 
This would be another (and based on logic) way of demonstrating it – quite diﬀ erent 
than a standard materialist argumentation showing that culture is an assemblage or 
composition of things, to which human and non-human actors contribute on equal 
(or at least, ontologically equal, if not empirically, in actual network) measures (per-
spective common for, among others, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Bruno Latour, 
Manuel DeLanda, Donna Haraway). So, here comes up another issue – theory of 
culture within realist perspective. If one acknowledges that culture is an arche-fossil, 
one cannot continue to approach culture from poststructuralist or phenomenological 
perspective, which remains within correlationism paradigm. But, where does it leave 
us? And, how to avoid slipping into simple reductionism of empirical sciences?
If we do not privilege relation between thought and being, then we should try to 
conceptualise other relations, within what we distinguish as culture. But since the 
26 See books on cinema or Francis Bacon of Gilles Deleuze, where he develops diﬀ erent than conceptual 
types of thinking.
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transcendental relation is not fundamental, how do we determine, what events and 
things are cultural? We could say that culture is all the events, objects, processes that 
concern human beings. However, are there any events that do not concern people? 
Deﬁ nitely culture would be ecological and geological – meaning also that it has the 
capacity to be mathematised – and theory has to take that in account. Meillassoux 
makes ontological, speculative ground for eco- and geological philosophy that takes 
culture as a part of processes wider and more complex than merely sign system logic 
that subjectivity imposes on being. Theory of culture could then consider these non-
-human processes, which science works on – and relate them to traditionally cultural 
institutions (what is the things in-themselves dimension of institutions and how it 
aﬀ ects the meaning ascribed to them?). Example of this kind of approach could be 
found in works of theorists like Friedrich Kittler, Bernard Stiegler, Siegfried Zielin-
ski, Jussi Parikka, who attempt to describe media and technology as autonomous and 
without relation to human(istic) subject.
However, there is a problem with the fundamental distinction of qualities. Do we 
describe cultural institutions with primary or secondary qualities? Meillassoux by 
making the distinction between in-itself and for-us lets correlationism to come back 
on the level of secondary qualities. Again, maybe it would be preferable to com-
mit to theory of powers or concept of machines introduced by Deleuze and Guattari 
in Anti-Oedipus. Subjective, phenomenological, inner experience is another system 
(actually, a multiplicity of systems), just as a body is a multiplicity of systems that 
consists of and belongs to diﬀ erent systems. Exceptionality of ﬁ rst person perspecti-
ve depends on, how these structures work – they have concrete and exclusive inputs/
outputs of that system. It is dependent on and created by the whole environment, 
but only in a certain moment of it our speciﬁ c consciousness, the I, emerges. Then, 
secondary qualities would be analogically eﬀ ects of unnecessary, contingent linking 
between multiple powers of a particular moment of being. For example, powers of 
an eye to receive certain light waves, of brain to relate sings to them, of social insti-
tutions that condition the ways of signiﬁ cation, of a coloured screen to transmit light 
and take shape, mediating powers of air, etc. To analyse culture in this paradigm is to 
calculate the set of powers that are at work and imagine, how they can change, what 
is their virtuality, ﬁ eld of diﬀ erentials, etc. Culture is a set of practices, processes, 
powers – independent from human subject correlation. However, this approach does 
not come down to Deleuze and Guattari only. Treating human desires, intentions, 
thoughts, cognitive schemas, etc. as equal elements of reality to which they rela-
te would also prompt thinking about culture in spirit of Humberto Maturana’s and 
Francisco Varela’s cognitive biology, Niklas Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic social 
system (following cybernetic theories of George Spencer-Brown and Gregory Bate-
son, on one hand, but Talcott Parsons with principle of analytical realism, too), Bruno 
Latour and group of other actor-network theory scholars and Peter Sloterdijk with his 
Spheres trilogy, where he gets at terms like foams, spheres, immunology to describe 
spaces of coexistence.
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We are talking today about naturecultures,27 technocultures – maybe we should 
think, how would they work without people to know better what is our contribution? 
This is a serious challenge to speak about reality co-produced by humans, but as if 
there were no humans (as we are used to understand humanity) around at all.28 Also, 
digitalised culture – in its various aspects like, commodiﬁ cation of aﬀ ects, algorit-
hmic governance, archivisation – more and more clearly escapes human control with 
simultaneous growth of impact on people; and opens up new capacities for analysis 
in non-human perspective.29 Although, we do not want to leave an impression that 
in the end it is not crucial to understand, how in various ways humanity signiﬁ es the 
being, we need to acknowledge the increase of processes inﬂ uencing human lives, 
for which our signiﬁ cation makes no diﬀ erence (for example, it does not matter, if we 
interpret global warming from a right or left wing politics, it is happening anyways – 
what does matter is, how societies act in face of it). Symptoms of this can be found in 
art, cinema and literature. Like for example, Spike Jonze’s ﬁ lm Her, where the main 
character falls in love with a female-stylised program, Lucy. As the movie tends to 
the end, she reﬂ ects on her situation and loses interest in interaction with a human and 
eventually escapes to a Rafael’s The-School-of-Athens-ish utopia of constant high-
-intellectual engagement with other programs like her.
Meillassoux gives a few theses that can be derived from the absolute of necessary 
contingency. According to Kant we cannot have knowledge of in-itself, but – unlike, 
for example, “strong correlationism” of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy – it is not 
completely unthinkable. In fact, Kant leaves some hints on the nature of noumens. 
They must be a priori existing and non-contradictory.30 Absolute prevents us from 
tautology and enables getting away from community solipsism. Knowledge is a prio-
ri synthetic, thought a priori analytic. It is the condition of ancestrality, thus it is 
condition of thought. Traditionally lack of reason for an occurrence of a particular 
fact was ascribed to the imperfection of thought – here Meillassoux turns it into the 
principle of the being itself, ontological principle of unreason. World does not have 
to change at all or to be in constant becoming. “It is not the eternal law of becoming, 
27 “One of the conceptual innovations stirred by debates in contemporary cultural theory that want to 
rewrite the linguistic turn concerns ‘naturecultures’. This concept is created by Donna Haraway in 
The Companion Species Manifesto (2003) in order to write the necessary entanglement of the natural 
and the cultural, the bodily and the mind, the material and the semiotic, et cetera. ‘Naturecultures’ 
oﬀ ers us an important route to rewrite these modernist oppositions in such a way that rather than 
representing parts of the world, a transcription with the world is being proposed. Concepts thus do 
not capture or mirror what is ‘out there’, but are fully immersed in a constantly changing reality. ‘Na-
turecultures’ rewrites not only femininity but in the end all subversive material practices as an ethical 
breakthrough of for instance phallologocentrism.” J. Parikka, https://jussiparikka.net/2011/03/21/
new-materialism-naturecultures-in-utrecht/ (access: 08.2016).
28 Like Nick Lands utopia of technologically embedded desire after annihilating human security system.
29 See digital studies of Ian Bogost and Nick Montfort, James Gleick, Alexander R. Galloway, Matthew 
Fuller, Lev Manovich, Katherine N. Hayles, for all of whom post-human perspective is common.
30 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude…, op. cit., p. 31; I. Kant, op. cit., p. 362.
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but rather the eternal and lawless possible becoming of every law.”31 Processes in 
the world do not have any necessity and always include variety of possible ways of 
evolving. The passage from the society in moment t
1
 to the society in t
2
 is contingent 
– they are like two separate monads that can be put together in a certain way, but this 
linkage does not imply their necessary dependency (which could be articulated as 
follows “there would be no Xavier Dolan ﬁ lms, if French New Wave of the 60s never 
happened”). Even linearity of time is dissolved and any passages between entities, 
events and processes are possible. If there is an absolute that is not a necessary object 
but a necessity of contingency, we should not use principle of suﬃ  cient reason for 
analysing culture. Processes, networks, trajectories, machines and relations between 
them should be addressed as contingent, as independent one of another, i.e. every 
process of society is an irreducible intensity or an open-closed monad-system. And, 
also, in the sense of how Meillassoux uses this term: every particular system has its 
own external environment, which provides sustainability of the system. Probably in 
this perspective Niklas Luhmann’s system theory is closer to Meillassoux’s venture 
than deleuzo-guattarean rhizomatic assemblages or actor-network theory.
Another issue is that mathematisation cannot be the only way to grasp the abso-
lute reality, otherwise, again, we revert to correlationism – this time having mathe-
matics-world correlate. It must be possible for the power to absolutise to exercise 
through diﬀ erent ways of thinking. Meillassoux admits it himself: “I don’t want to 
demonstrate that there is a necessary relation between mathematics and reality.”32 
Maybe mathematics has this power at this historical moment, but for societies in 
past it emerged within mythical thinking or always existed in art? However, this 
conclusion is concerning, because we know perfectly well (through works of many 
artists, writers and philosophers33) that “we have never been modern”, never achieved 
Enlightenment, we keep on living our myths – always there has to be a hidden dwarf 
pulling strings of thought. Meillassoux’s approach grounds on distinction between 
properties and this two-fold structure of reality is necessary to speak about absolute. 
One level of reality infected is by interests (aﬀ ects, sensual data, social position, 
etc. – secondary qualities) and second level of objective properties makes apparent 
the disinterested reality, which can function as a basis for knowledge that bonds ev-
eryone. This resembles classical Marxist methodology, but it would be problematic 
31 Ibidem, p. 64. This sentence is followed by another, where Meillassoux adds that “it is a Time capable 
of destroying even becoming itself by bringing forth, perhaps forever, ﬁ xity, stasis, and death”. Here, 
we cannot agree – although time is capable of destroying becoming of particular entity, it would be 
falling into contradiction to claim that all of becoming can cease. Absolute stasis or absolute death 
contradicts the notion of contingency – equated with capacity-to-be-other – because there would be 
no change, no capacity at all. Absolute stasis has nothing to do with eternality of some entity or law. 
The latter maintains the capacity-to-be-other, the former is a negation of it.
32 R. Mackay (ed.), op. cit., p. 328.
33 Like, for example, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Bruno Latour, Bolesław Miciński, Mieczysław 
Jastrun, Don DeLillo.
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for more critical thread within Marxism. Here we could turn toward, for example, 
world-system theories developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and Jason W. Moore 
(who attempts to think about capitalism as a way of organising nature by nature 
itself). The trouble with Meillassoux’s project is that it seems to reproduce the same 
mistake that early 20th century Marxists have made – neglecting or overlooking an 
ideology as a material force that intervenes into the social realm. Thinking does not 
determine “the great outdoors” transcendentally, but rather thinking can inﬂ uence 
it analogically to geological forces. Psychoanalysis proved us that our ideological 
fantasies, images belong to the level of secondary qualities and do impact on primary 
qualities of reality.
Culture is an arche-fossil. It is reasonable then to consider deep media and deep 
time – line of thought taken by media theorists like Parikka or Zielinski. Ancestral 
statements are possible due to powers of strata as a medium for non-human times 
to arrive at present. Therefore, disclosing which fossils and materials have capac-
ities to work as media and how this is enabled by entanglements of people, ani-
mals, bacteria, machines, etc., also should have its place in spectrum of application 
of speculative materialism. Sigmund Freud once mentioned that Rome, with its ru-
ins, inscriptions, old temples, works as a metaphor of the unconscious – which is 
non-human in sense that it is not reduced to human subject. Stroll around the city, 
touch a wall of a chiesa and feel the multiple unconscious ﬂ ows gush through your 
body. Like in Pablo Neruda’s Hights of Macchu Picchu we can retain the lost past, the 
world that was suppressed by centuries of everyday life and accretion of diﬀ erent cul-
ture that grew after whipping the old one out. Due to the power to think the absolute 
outside – that what was not strictly for-us, but as a moment in time only in-itself – we 
can recall worlds lost long ago.
Before concluding, it is worth to touch just the last thread of After Finitude – 
its political dimension and commitment to a tendency in contemporary continental 
philosophy that can be described as the “New Enlightenment.”34 Meillassoux inter-
venes in the everlasting debate between Athens and Jerusalem,35 which goes down 
to a question, whether logos rules the will from above or is it other way around? 
His proposition is peculiar, because he points to rationality of logical structure of 
world, but this logos is as unsettled as divine free will. French philosopher opens 
a possibility to think diversity under logos of the absolute. If correlationism ends 
up as multiculturalism of atomised and individualised societies, traditions, cultural 
groups based on identiﬁ cation (identities are constructed along lines of distinction in 
points of perspective), suitable for capitalistic commodiﬁ cation, then maybe specu-
lative materialism gives ground for a kind of hegemony and common ground for the 
community? We need to speculate on a new enlightened hegemony of multiple in 
34 It seems that the desire to rethink Entlightenment is common among such philosophers as Catherine 
Malabou, Alain Badiou, Rosi Braidotti, Ray Brassier, Reza Negarestani, Slavoj Žižek, Nick Land.
35 So lucidly outlined by Lev Shestov in Athens and Jerusalem.
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order to produce a hiperstition,36 a futurous idea that programs the present and the 
past. Hegemony based on mathematisable knowledge bypassing any kind of personal 
or group interest, relations of historically sedimented power, etc. This would recreate 
a vision of science not engaged in political debates (that is why Meillassoux (just as 
Badiou) is not sure about biology, which is heavily biased politically). Speculative 
materialism would come against those theories of culture that claim everything is 
about power relations and political/ideological struggle (like Marxism). But it is ob-
viously contradictory to use term “hegemony” in a depoliticised context. And, also, 
old trouble of how can we avoid falling back to locality of thought and imposing it 
as a norm for everyone? Meillassoux gives some very lucid passages showing resem-
blances between position of a correlationist and someone who believes in creationism 
or ﬁ deism position. They all have in common holding that it is impossible to think 
the absolute and produce knowledge on and from it. If one abstains from this endeav-
our, she opens up a space for any sort of truth to be possible and leaves the choice to 
belief. Speculative materialism injected to cultural and political theory could mean 
searching within human-nonhuman networks paths for the New Enlightenment.
Gilles Deleuze in an interview with Claire Parnet, L’Abécédaire, recorded for 
French television said: “there is an inhumanity proper to the human body and to the 
human mind, there are animal relations with the animals.”37 Predecessor of so called 
“new materialism” enunciated one of the most urgent issues for philosophy – to think 
non-human within human. In the wake of After Finitude – which might even turn out 
to be a milestone for continental philosophy – it is crucial to follow the paths that 
Meillassoux opens up in his book and see where he takes us. As another important 
voice in the debate, it is desirable to attempt to translate its ontological framework 
onto cultural or political theory.
This conviction and striving to point out that applying speculative materialism 
to cultural theory is not evident were the main aims of this paper. So, how does the 
reintroducing of the absolute change the way we think about that which was usually 
ascribed to the box of human creation? What if the eﬀ ect was that nothing is left 
human? Either we refer to modern, humanistic subject or we talk about bodies that 
humanise within nature with a minor “n” (merging together Baruch Spinoza and 
Jason W. Moore). Other issue faced in this paper was the fact that, in some sense, 
the problem of culture in speculative materialism envelopes itself and goes back to 
36 A term coined by N. Land and deﬁ ned by N. Srnicek and A. Williams in “as a kind of ﬁ ction, but 
one that aims to transform itself into a truth. Hyperstitions operate by catalysing dispersed sentiment 
into a historical force that brings the future into existence. They have the temporal form of will have 
been.” N. Srnicek, A. Williams, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World without Work, 
Verso, London–New York 2015, ch. 4. Left Modernity, part Hyperstitional progress. In their book 
Srnicek and Williams emphasise on the need to construct a new vision of Future, a concrete set of 
political postulates that will assemble all the potential left electorate: form factory working class, 
through blue-collar, to precarious workers in cultural institutions.
37 L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, Pierre-André Boutang, France 1988–1989.
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an ontological question: are there other ways to speak of the absolute? If so, how to 
discern them? Given once to a certain type of language, is it not just a small step away 
from ascribing the power to reach the absolute to all discourses and languages? Are 
we not back, where we left – validating every fundamentalism, ﬁ deism, solipsism? 
All these questions are legitimate and need to be dealt with in a broader, more pro-
found, book-length manner. Certainly, we can show some points of reference for cul-
tural theory produced from speculative materialism position, like: mathematisation 
as a way to exercise powers to reach the absolute enable us to think analogically other 
social practices; this based on a duality of properties that allows us to have objective 
knowledge of the reality; new enlightenment as a new cultural and political endeav-
our, which is desired in face of multiple problems permeating our aﬀ ective systems 
(symptoms of which can be traced in political, media and para-scientiﬁ c discourse); 
nonlinearity of processes creating culture.
However, these questions and indications have now existed for long time in phi-
losophy of culture, theory of culture, anthropology, cybernetics, media studies, ecolo-
gy and many other disciplines. From what we get in After Finitude it is uncertain how 
speculative materialism could inﬂ uence theorising culture. At the moment it indicates 
a wide range of names and propositions which share materialistic view on method-
ology and tendency to break with humanistic boundaries, but it seems not enough to 
actually produce something new on diﬀ erent level then ontological refutation of cor-
relationism. If Meillassoux does not want After Finitude to meet, in his own words, 
“the fate of most ontological problems: a progressive abandonment, legitimated by 
the persistent failure that various attempts at resolving it have met with”,38 he needs 
to think over broader application of his theory.
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